Oberlin

Digital Commons at Oberlin
Honors Papers

Student Work

1979

The Three Frances: 1940-1944
Sarah Fishman
Oberlin College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.oberlin.edu/honors
Part of the History Commons

Repository Citation
Fishman, Sarah, "The Three Frances: 1940-1944" (1979). Honors Papers. 715.
https://digitalcommons.oberlin.edu/honors/715

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Work at Digital Commons at Oberlin. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Honors Papers by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons at Oberlin. For
more information, please contact megan.mitchell@oberlin.edu.

THE THl:iEE T{ANCBS:

1940-1944

Sarah 1!'ishman
Senior Honors Thesis
-l ,

.'\ T\-....
A~.L ... -'-

30 ,f. . 9'79
I

';:'0

Claude and Laurence "!Joubinsky
whose help and encouragement
made this thesis

a pleasurable and rewarding experience

Chapter

Page

.......................... .i
Collaboration. .......... .. 1

Introduction.
Chapter One:

Notas to Chapter Ons ......•..
Chapter Two:

.2.5

Passive Prance .......... . 28

·......... ..51
Chapter Three: Resistance. ·......... . . .54
Notes to Chapter Three ....• ·......... ..79
Conclusion .•. ·.......... ............ . . 82
Notes to Chapter Two ...... .

"

Bibliography.
Interviews .•.

•

.....................

I

•••

. 84

·.. , .................... . . 87

INTRODUCTION

France during the German Occupation was divided into
two zones, the northern two/thirds, directly occupied
by German troops, and the southern zone, which remained

until -1942 an independent French state.

However France,

divided more than physically, can also be broken down
into three groups, the Collaborators and the Resisters,
who responded actively to the Occupation, and Passive
France, the large majority of French people who allowed
events to run their course without attempting actively
to shape them.
This thesis, rather than a history of France from

1940 through 1944, will examine these three categories
of response to the occupation.

\I/hy did some collaborate,

some resist, and the majority remain passive?

'ii/hat role

did the prewar period play in furthering this division
of France?

Were there general attitudes about France

and her relationship to Germany and to the Allies that
characterized each group as a whole?

What ideas about

the political, social, and economic future of France motivitated each group?

Finally, what was the significance

of the choices each group made for themselves and for
France?
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Chapter One
Collaboration

The collaborators, defined as those who actively shaped
policies ot tried to, openly voiced pro-collaboration sentiments, and those who worked, out of choice, with the Germans, included a wide variety of. pepple with a wide range
of ideas.

They can be broken down into two categories:

official collaborators, which includes the prominent Vichy
leaders such as Petain and Laval, the less visible but no
less important corps of civil servants, and unofficial collaborator~,

which includes the ideological collaboration of

fascist writers such as Drieu la Rochelle and Robert Brasillach and of leaders of fascist groups such as Jacques Doriot,
and the opportunistic collaboration of journalists( several
members of the pre-war Left, and profiteers.

This distinc-

tion is made simply on the basis of the holding of an official position of power and does not imply that official collaborators had no ideology.
Collaboration was a decision to work with Germany.

To

understand why men like Petain and the fascists, whose traditional orientation had been nationalistic and anti-German,
chose this path is the focus of this chapter.
the prewar years was crucial to this decision.

The role of
In the ini-

tial post-World War One period, the two opposing forces,
the traditionalists, who were never reconciled to the principles of the Revolution and wished for a return to social
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hierarchy, rural decentralized society, and even in some
cases monarchy, and the Jacobin Left, socialists, syndicatists and communists who pushed for a strong centralized
state and a planned economy, were balanced by a wide middle
range of Liberals who espoused political and legal liberalism, universal suffrage, and equalLty, but were socially
conservative and opposed to an active state.

Thus, al-

though France on the surface was turbulent, underneath was
a fairly stable balance and a broad consensus of middle
class, liberal beliefs, the "Republican synthesis".
Developments in the mid-thirties, both internal and
external, were to shatter this balance.
came to power in Germany.
finally felt in France.

In 1933 Hitler

The world wide depression was
Several ministers were suspected

of shielding a fraudulent financier named Stavisky from
prosecution.

Veterans' pensions were cut back.

All of

this catalyzed the Right into action and on February 6,

1934, massive demonstrations rocked Paris, causing the
Prime Minister to resign.

In response to this uprising of

the Right at home and the threat of fascism abroad, the
Socialists, Communists,! and the Radicals formed a coalition, the Popular Front, which came to power in 1936 with
the election of L60n Blum.

The Popular Front was unable

to resolve the economic crisis primarily because they did
not have specific formulas for the scale and type of reform
needed.

The Spanish Civil War accentuated the Left-Right

polarization of France and created a rift in the coalition
between pacifists who wanted to avoid war at all costs,
and those who felt the threat of fascism would have to be
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fought.

The Popular Front was unable to bring about wide -

scale reform.

It did, however, alarm the Right, who saw

it as a Communist takeover.

The Right was leaning more

and more towards appeasement of Germany to prevent the spread
of Bolshevism and to avoid war and disaster.

The Third

Republic was unable to overcome this polarization and went
through a series of crises and ministers until the defeat
of 1940)when it voted itself out of existence.

I .

Those who collahorated in 1940 had already chosen sides
in the mid-thirtieso
o~

Most collaborators had been members

the pre-war Right, those who had participated in the

nationalist demonstrations

o~

1934, those removed from

o~

fice or defeated by the Popular Front in the 1936 elections,
and leaders

o~ prot~fascist

leagues or veterans groups.

In general, they were alienated
Third Republic.

~rom

or antagonized by the

The traditionalists, members of the old

upper class who had had wealth but little political influence, resented the Third depublic and yearned for a return
~~tJJtf\{'rQJVt (~l\kJ(y

to the conditions in the1\ days of France's greatness.

These

men became the prominent Vichy leaders and set the tone
for Vichy but in the end were unable to set the direction,
which is why Paxton calls Vichy "the last stand of men who
believed a nation could exert world influence without passing through the industrial revolution". 1
The bureaucrats, a highly trained and select group
of administrators, felt vastly superior to the elected
deputies from whom they had taken orders.

In 1940, they

finally had the freedom they wanted and ultimately they
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played a crucial role in the direction of Vichy}internal
politics.

Many journalists had also been highly alien-

ated from the 'Third Republic.

The overabundance of journ-

alists in an industry controlled almost exclusively by
several large financiers created an underpaid, underemployed and resentful group that delighted in the demise
of the Third Republic and the freedom it gave them.
Fimlly, and most surprisingly, were the few members
of the pre-war Left coalition who found their way into the
collaborationist camp.

Men such as Marcel Deat, Charles

Spinasse, find f.larcel Bucard, who were ardent pacifists,
were uncomfortable in the Popular Front coalition.

They

were apprehensive about the ,communists and, by 1940, were
disillusioned with the Parliamentary system's inability
to act.

Although their political ideas were in opposi-'

tion to conservative or fascist ideas, they may have seen
collaboration as an opportunity to accomplish their goals
in a strong state.
With the exception of the Leftists, collaborators had
been on the Right of the political spectrum.

The first

problem to confront them was the external Franco-German
one.

In 1940, collaboration meant a decision to accept

Germany's victory over France as definitive.

This was an

important choice, as there were other options that were
given serious consideration.

Plans were made to go to

North Africa and continue the fight from there.
1940 Francets navy was still intact, General

In June

Nogu~rl

forces

in North Africa were ready to fight and supplies were on
their way from the United States.

Yet the government de-
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cided not to continue the fight, partly because it seemed
militarily unfeasible.

The French army, victors of World

War I, had been defeated in less than six weeks.
could not withstand Germany's might, who. could?

If they
On June

16 Marshall Petain threatened to resign if he could not
sue for peace. "'-- The experience of World War I also lead
to a strong desire, in the population as well as the government, to avoid the chaos and destruction of turning
France into a battleground.

Russia's experience in 1917

led() many to believe that continued warfare not only meant
destruction but revolution and communism.

Finally.,. the

country as compared to its World War I rally uTo Berlin"
was so internally divided that there was no unified drive
f<.i mod
to fight the Germans. Thus BsiaatcI turned over the Prime
Ministry to Philippe Petain, who asked

f~r

an Armistice.

The existence of a French state in the unoccupied zone
meant that a certain amount of collaboration would be inevitable.

However, other important assumptions were made

that caused collaboration with Germany to go far beyond
this minimum.

Central to the decision to collaborate was

the supposition that Germany was the wave of the future
and that France's best policy was to work towards a European bloc with Germany the centrifugal force and France
an autonomous partner.

This bloc wuuld be able to withstand

the imperiali'sm of Great Britain, the United States, and
Russia and would be itself an imperialistic power in Africa,
----~

France's escape vitale and a major source of raw materials
for Eur9pe.
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O££icially, this attempt to build a new order took
the £orm o£ incessant o££ers o£ closer collaboration in
return £or a definitive peace treaty that would normalize
relations between the two countries and lessen the punitive aspects o£ the armistice.

Petain, in a speech o£

August 14, 1941, lamented that "our relations with Germany
are defined by an Armistice the character o£ which can
only be provisional tr • 2 He went on to ask the French to
ttsurmount the heavy heritage o£ mistrust bequeathed by
centuries o£ dissension and quarrels, in order to orient
ourselves towards the larger perspectives of a reconciled
continent tJ • 3 On October 22, 1941, Petain and Laval met
with Hitler and Ribbentrop in the town o£ Montoire.

In

spite o£ Laval's postwar claim that he udid not engineer
this meeting il4 they were, according to Robert Paxton's
research into German archives, the culmination o£ months
of French entreaty.5

The meetings were highly publicized
"..

but all that came o£ them was that "Marshal Petain and
Chancellor Hitler agreed on the principle o£ collaboration
to reconstruct peace in Europe ll • 6
Viehy leaders were supported in their e££orts to reorder France's external situation by the uno£ficial collaborators.

Robert Brasillach, a fascist essayist and journ-

alist, agreed with the principle o£ collaboration because
"the politics o£ Montoire is the onll course open to France
• • • we are £or collaboration with dignitl, because it is
simply the only means to pull ourselves through and to
avoid the return o£ the bloody errors that lead us to this
atrocious and lost war".!
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Drieu LaRochelle, a novelist and fascist essayist,
saw the question in terms of huge masses. To him, the
20 th Century was the century of continents dominated by
the hegemony of one nation, such as the United States in
the Western hemisphere and Japan in Asia.

Faced with

these vast agglomerations, Drieu felt Europe had to regroup if she were not to perish.

France, "only one ele-

ment among other elements of the first class u8 , could no
longer make it on her own as a world power and would therefore have to take her place . in a Europe of hierarchical
forces.

Germany, the uincomparable force to which hege-

mony can no longer be disputed or refused,,9, would be in
the middle surrounded by the next largest powers, England,
Italy, and France, and then a whole degradation of smaller
powers. 10
Lucien Rebatet, another fascist writer, had none of
Drieuts or Brasillach's hesitancy in accepting France's
defeat and was the only writer I found to do so out of admiration for Germany's internal system.

flWhat possibly

can the 1942 generation of French hate in the Germans?
After all, their knowledge of Germany is nil, they don't
want to learn anything, and they only hold childish ideas
about them.

These are therefore the prejudices that it

is important to fight first of all." 11

He felt that the

"liquidation of an interminable quarrel" between France
and Germany would be none of the grand events in the history of this Planet".12
Jacques Doriot, leader of the protofascist Parti Popu-
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laire FranraiSr, called for collaboration with Germany,
who, because of its powerful economic organization and
its political situation, would become the key to the entire European system.

He felt that France would only be

strengthened by adapting herself to the economy of a continental bloc.
These pro-German leanings were strengthened by growing anti-British feelings.

To the collaborators, England

had, with a system of alliances, leJ:l France into the war
and deserted her at Dunkirk.

The bombing of the French

navy on July 4, 1940, at Mers-el-Kebir exacerbated this
tension and the situation in North Africa in 1941 almost
caused it to break out into full-fledged war.

England's

attacks and advances in Africa were always taken to be
aggressions against France.

It was at this point that

French and German interests most closely coincided and
therefore that French collaboration went the farthest.
Vichy was determined not to loose "a square yard of her
home territory nor yet of her colonial empire n13 , even if
that meant ffa reordering of so-called 'traditional' external friendships ot enmities. n14 Throughout 1941 Vichy
forces fought off Anglo-Gaullist attacks in North Africa
and Syria.

In May, 1941, the Protocols of Paris were

signed allowing Germany to use Syrian airfields and military supplies to exploit the anti-British uprising in Iraq.
After they signed, Admiral

Fran~ois

Darlan, then the foreign

minister of Vichy, expressed his anger at England, nwho
treats us like a continental Ireland, indeed like a colony. ,, 15
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strong resentment towards England was also expressed
by the unofficial collaborators. Abel Bonnard, a member
of the Academme Fransaise and a conservative with fascist
leanings, accused England of "dragging France into this
war where she so poorly supported us n16 and then having
the nerve to speak of France as having sold out to the
enemy.

"Without a doubt, England calls sold governments

she could not buy.,,17
Lucien Rebatet blamed the war entirely on two agents,
"Jews and Great Britain".18

He allegorized France as an

innocent virgin whose maidenhood was torn to pieces by
her evil guardians in London who sent her alone to meet
the big bad wolf. 19
Drieu LaRochelle accused England of being the "vassal
of America t • 20 and of trying to recuperate in Africa and
Syria what she had lost to the United States.

Anti-

British feelings were extended by many collaborators to
include anti-Americanism.

According to Rebatet, "the
United States are making a joke out of England fJ • 21 The
official collaborators, however, did their best not to anj

tagonize the United States, who in 1941 put pressure on
England to ease the blockade of

Fr~c~,

easily seize France's colonial empire.

and who could
When the United

States entered the war in 1942 she became much tougher
on Vichy, who nevertheless continued to try to appease the
United States and avoid antagonism.
However, among the fascist writers anti-Americanism
was vicious.

The United States, according to Brasillach
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trone of the most dangerous enemies .Q1 France,,22, together
with England, ledd France into the war and then attempted
to do to England what England had done to France, leave
her to do the fighting while stealing her empire.

To the

'" fascists, America was the citadel of all they hated.

"Of

130 million inhabitants in the United States, there are
first 13 million blacks, next 8 million Jews. ,, 23

Rebatet

wrote, ftthe enormous load of democracy is over there today, with its adolescent silliness, our defects proportional
to skyscrapers, ten
peasants".24

~imes

more Jews, one hundred times more

America was as far from France in spirit as

it was in miles.

How could the manufacturers of skyscrapers

in series have any respect for flour cities, our villages,
our customs, and our conception of life,,?25

Journalists

and writers were afraid, especially after the United States
entered the war, that an Allied victory would mean American dominance in Europe and that American mass culture
would invade along with the soldiers and dollars and annihilate "ancient and glorious nations u26 like France. "America governing Europe, what madness!,,27
The new European order would also be able to withstand
Soviet Russia.

Before ,the war, the feeling that a strong

Germany was the best barrier to Russia leJc~ many conservatives, who previously favored a tough policy towards Germany, to call for appeasement.

Official and unofficial

collaborators were overjoyed when Germany invaded the Soviet Union.

A French division of the Waffen SS, the Char-

lemagne diVision, was formed by Joseph Darnard to fight
the Russians on the eastern front.
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All of these reasons for choosing to work with the
Germans, the feeling that the war was lost, that a German
victory was really better for France than a British victory or an American or a Russian victory, that France
could, by bargaining with the Germans, become a partner
in a European bloc, underline the fact that collaborators,
with very few exceptions, did not feel they were betraying France or being unpatriotic.

Nor were they passively

reacting to German demands but actively taking direction
of France's external affairs.

They were serving France's

interests in what they saw as the best way.

They rightly

foresaw that France alone was no longer a world power,
and while they accused the resistants and Gaullists of
being England's pawns, they themselves ended up pawns of
Germany.

Because of their misinterpretation of their ca-

pacity to deal with Germany, "Vichy was more like a
pressed orange than like a tough nut ft • 28 Ultimately,
Vichy was unable to preserve France's colonial empire or
her navy or prevent the total occupation of France.
So far collaboration has been dealt with in terms of
its Franco-German aspect.
was the

Fr~o-French

Of equal importance, however,

aspect, for collaborators wanted

more than a reordering of external affairs.
ton writes:

Robert Pax-

"Collaboration now meant taking advanta;ge of

a foreign army to carry out major changes in the way Frenchmen were governed, schooled, and employed. n29

Especially

in this sense, Vichy France can be seen as the continuation
of the virtual civil war that existed in France before the
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occupation.

Most collaborators, members of the anti-

Republican Right, saw the death of the Third Republic as
a triumph for them, and they vented their frustrations by
blaming it for the defeat.

"The disaster is only, in real-

ity, the reflection in military matters of the weaknesses
and defects of the former political regime",30 Petain declared.

It was the endless struggle of coalitions of nar-

row economic interests that rendered the government weak
and incapable of dealing with internal problems or of conducting an external policy tfworthy of France JJ • 31 Not only
was the political system indicted;

Catholic Church lead-

ers saw the defeat as punishment for France's moral degeneracy, as evidenced by "paid vacations, pernod, strikes,
bad films, bathing suits, democracy, and the absence of
religion". 32

Brasillach, in his journal written in a pri-

soner of war camp in Germany, described the 1930's as a
"period of sleep. • • but it was also one of the most ridiculous periods.

Never have stupidity, pedantry, bombast,

pretension, and triumphant mediocrity been so arrogant".33
Rebatet described France as "covered with ruins, ruins of
things, ruins of dogmas l1 and attributed these ruins not
to a "single and fortuitous calamity" but to a "long slipping, a series of successive collapses that have accumulated these enormous piles of debris". 34

~.Q!:l ~ Peuple,

Doriot's fascist newspaper, e_pressed strongly this hatred
of the Third Republic in its description of Marianne de
France, "that insolent emblem of. • • an abhored regime. • •
infamous whore, with your Constitution of nothingness, your
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regime of social injustice, your doctrine of lies, and
your Godless morality ff.35
Collaborators went beyond simply denouncing the former system.

They actively attempted to rebuild France ac-

cording to their new image.

After the war the Vichy not-

ables tried to gloss this over by blaming the legislation
and actions taken by the government on German pressure.
However, German pressure on France's internal affairs, at
least until 1942, was practically nonexistent and it was
in this initial period that almost all the laws wene
passed. 36
3efore attempting to define a general collaborationist
mentality, it must be noted that there were wide differences in ideology and a wide variety of goals among the
collaborators.

The traditionalists, the bureaucrats, and

the fascists all had different aims for France's reconstruction.

The traditionalists' program was the official

"National Revolution U , an examination of which will indicate their major goals.

Petain, the primary spokesman

for Vichy and the traditionalists, replaced ULiberty, Equality, and Fraternity" with the motto "Work, Family, and
Fatherland".

This signified a political restructing

away from democracy and the "false idea of the natural
equality of man u37 towards a system of social hierarchy
led by the true elites.
Traditionalists also wanted to root out the modern
mass culture, decadence, and anti-clericalism they saw as
the cause of France's decline.

Petain felt "a good mass
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never did anyone any harm u38 and saw the strengthening of
Catholicism as an important part of the National Revolution.

Vichy France did much to ease longstanding Church-

State tensions, such as granting aid to Bishops for educational use and restoring Church property confiscated and
not yet used.

This gained Vichy the support of several

prominent Church leaders.

Pleased by this new direction,

they also justified their support by the traditional loyalty of the church to . "those who legitamately hold power. u39
Serious criticism by the Church came only in 1942 with the
massive deportations of Jews.
The traditional Vichy program also set out to improve
the condition of France's youth.

Petain wrote that of the

tasks the government had to undertake, none were more important than the reform of national education. 40 The
educational system was purged of Free Masons and Jews, and
all teachers were required to take an oath of loyalty to
~tain.

The curriculum was restructured to include reli-

gious education and courses in good citizenship.

The

government also supported various youth groups, such as
the Chantiers Q§ la Jeunesse, a group created by the army
to remove draft age men from the cities and put them to
work in the countryside.

In 1942 eight months of ser-

vice in the Chantiers became mandatory for all 21-year-old
men.
Concern about social decadence centered-' on the declining birthrate in France.

To the traditionalist, the

family was the core of French society, Uthe essential
cell and the foundation of the social edifice",41 as

Pe-
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tain put it.
ily.

Programs were set up to strengthen the fam-

Birth control had already been outlawed, so Vichy

outlawed abortion and divorce during the first three
years of marriage.
fathers

af 1

Incentive payments were set up for

l' i..ti

,~

of large families, who were also

rewarded with statutory seats on local committees.

For

the mothers there was the Medal of the French Family, who,
by fltheir enlightened care, laborious activity, and their
devotion, have made a constant effort in the best way to
inspire in their children physical and moral hygiene, love
of work, and the probity and care of social and patriotic
duties".42
The official economic program of Vichy was based on
the traditional desire to move away from modern concentration and depersonalization of agriculture and industry.
Vichy promoted a return to the soil program in an attempt
to rebuild family agricultural units, "the principle economic and social base of France".43

Corporatism, a third

way between Communism and Capitalism, was the principle
of industrial reorganization.

Ideally, employers, managers,

and workers would organise into natural economic groupings
by branch of industry.

These corporations would govern

themselves, thus attenuating the chaos of the free market system, since all members would share an interest in
their corporation.

Class struggle would be eliminated.

Just in case, Petain outlawed strikes and lock-outs and
dissolved all workers' unions and syndicates.
This was the public face of Vichy but underneath the
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surface, the experts, civil servants, and technicians had
different goals in mind.

They were pushing France away

from family business, small farms, and self-regulation
towards economic centralization and concentrated industry.

This was partly due to the necessity of meeting

Germany's demands and to the scarcity of raw materials.
The civil servants, although a conservative, highly elite
group of men, were not traditionalists and, when freed
from the meddling of elected officials, administered France's
economy as efficiently as possible.
Opposing both the traditionalists and the bureaucrats
was another strand of ideolpgy for rebuilding France, that
of the fascist intellectuals and group leaders who, until
the last months of the German occupation, never had any
official power or influence.

Their writings demonstrate

most strongly what they were against.

They were, as already

noted, anti-communist, anti-American, and anti-British.
They also condemned the softness, mediocrity, egoism, and
materialism of pre-war French society and were troubleoc:
by the decadence and decline of France.

This they blamed

partly on the dehumanization and mechanization of capitalism, false ideas of liberty, and the political institution
of democracy, but they felt it was primarily due to the }
moral and physical degradation of the people.

They had

vague ideas of economic reorganization such as the breaking up of trusts and monied interests.

Drieu yearned for

a return to a medieval-type guild system.

Above all,

Fascists sought the rejuvenation of France through a spir-
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itual revolution.

Their vision was of an ideal manhood

of discipline, energy, vitality, and strength, thus Brasillach's concern with setting up youth organizations that
would mold France's young men.

Unlike German Nazism, French

fascism remained elitist, believing that the country should
be run by small groups of exceptional men, and never became a mass movement.

It was unable to attract support

in a society that had not broken down to the extent that
Germany's society had, and French fascists were never able
to unite into one group with one leader.
They differed from the traditionalists in that the
ruling elite would not be drawn from the old social classes
but from all social groups.

They disliked the softness
-/heir
and complacency of upper class values and ~ reliance on
Catholicism.

While they

i'("o.\~d
initiall~ Vichy's

reforms, they

frequently criticized it for not going far enough fast
enough.
Despite this wide range 01 ideologies and goals, there
were some common denominators that make the label "collaborator" viable and were central to the decision to collab,::o.
orate.

The strongest link among all collaborators was

anti-communism.

Communists always represent a threat to

the property and standing of the old upper classes.

Fas-

cists disliked the Communist materialism and emphasis on
the economic motivation of mants actions.
Communists were also feared because of their ties with
Russia.

Brasillach, in responding to the increase in acts

of sabotage, said, "Mo scow alone is guilty • • • f1oscow
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wants the loss of France, wants revolution,s.44

Drieu La

Rochelle instructed those who claimed that communism in
France would be a native French communism to "go ask the
people of Bessarabia, Lithuania, or Poland if the communism
installed by the red hordes is Bessarabian, Lithuanian,
or Polish.

It is rtussian and Russian Jewish entirely • • • ,,45

The Communist Party itself did much to provoke this fear
and Drieu's charge that ucommunists are French patriots
when the Russians tell them to pretend to be n • 46 Throughout the twenties the Communist Party remained isolated from
French politics.

In the mid-thirties, when Russian fears

were aroused by Germany's militarism and a strong France
seemed desirable, the Party became highly nationalistic
and anti-fascist.

The sincerity of the communists' pat-

riotism was thrown into doubt in 1939 with the signing of
the Hitler-Stalin pact, when the party made an abrupt aboutface, refused to support the war effort, and denounced the
war as imperialistic folly.

In 1941, when Germany attacked

Russia, the party once again switched lines and became
highly patriotic and its members became leading participants in the Resistance.

This series of changes not only

lead the collaborationists to believe that French communists
were Russian agents, but also caused a great deal of confusion among the rank-and-file members.
an ex-communist, announced in

~

Marcel Giltin,

QE.!,-sll! Peuple that he

left the Communist Party because of its hypocrisy and tactical use of patriotism.

tlWe have refused to accomplish
so cynical an about-face. u47 To all collaborators, com-
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munism represented a horrible danger, "not only to civilization, but to the well-being of each of us • • • to the
family, the career, the fields, the factory, the shop, the
workshop, the laboratory, the office ll • 48
The fear of Communism was closely related to the
second aspect of a collaborationist mentality:
sooial disorder.

fear of

At the outset the Vichy officials mani-

fested this fear by deciding not to continue the fight, as
the disorder that would have been created by oontinued warfare was considered a worse danger than occupation by foreign troops.

This concern for order was a primary reason

so many civil servants and local government officials
stayed on the job.

In 1941 Camille Vernet, the prefect

of Tours during the German invasion of June, 1940, was honored with these words:

"You-' did your duty, you stayed

on the job, you avoided panic and maintained order in
Tours.

You have given a good example to the country.n 49

The fear of social disorder explains why, even after the
colonies were lost, France totally occupied, the navy scuttled, Viohy officials stayed on the job.

Laval claimed

after the war, "Had I abandoned my post in November, 1942,
the whole of the country would have become a vast maquis.
The cost would have been thousands and thousands of dead.
• • • How could the head of the Government be justified
in making a decision which would expose the entire French
population to this terrible risk? 1f 50

This is one reason

that the Vichy leaders did not quit even after the war
had turned decisively against Germany.

Petain, in Nay,
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1944, warned the population against joining the Resistance
because it would lead to fla civil 'War which will destroy
all that the foreign war has saved until now. • • The
voices that preach disobedience to you are not French
voices (and) will deliver the country to a disaster that
all my efforts wanted it to avoid. • • Order, work, and
union are the necessary conditions of our restoration. n51
The government's equation of the Resistance with
Communism and terrorism lead to the most brutal collaboration with German repression during the lastfwo years
of the occupation.

.

A special mmlitia, created by Darnand,

was used to fight the Resistance and became an instrument
of terror and repression.

In recruiting its members, it

issued "a call to all who want to fight in its ranks, animated by the spirit of sacrifice.

Its goals for the moment

are the struggle against terrorism. u52
plauded this repression.

The fascists ap-

They had previously criticized

the government for not going far enough.

Brasillach in

1941 suggested simply shooting all the Communist leaders
already in jail. 53
Although there were differences in ideology among the
Collaborators, all of them were anti-Liberals and denied
democracy, equalIty, and liberty in exchange for order,
hierarchy, and authority.
Finally, all collaborators believed in purging France
of Free Masons, who were accused of being a conspiritorial
society.

Because they were frequently socialists and anti-

clericalists, they were seen as symbolic of the hated Third
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Republic.

Dislike of Free Masons was prevalent but it was

fairly mild and manifested itself in firings of civil servants and the publishing of lists of leading citizens who
Vlere Free !'4asons.
The collaborators also wanted to purge France of Jews,
a favorite scapegoat everywhere in the interwar years.
They were accused of subverting France's economy and of
trying to take over the government.

The French middle

class's antisemitism was a displaced resentment of the
larger economic forces that were crushing them.

The upper

J.ib\;~

classes had a traditional,,, for Jews, and among professionals
such as doctors and lawyers Jews were hated for their
success in these overcrowded fields.
Antisemitism in France went beyond this economic motive, but it was different from Nazi antisemitism.
than being racial, it was primarily cultural.

Rather

Jews were

resented because they were different, a separate people
who could not be assimilated into French culture.

Vallat

asserted that the Alibert law was written within the country's right of "protecting the national community against
the abuses and harmful influence of a foreign element tl • 54
~rieu,

in a confused analysis of the Jewish problem, de-

fined Jews as a racial and not a religious group.

How-

ever, what he disliked was their "pretention to form a
people among each people and a people above all other
peoples ll • 55 His solution was the gradual assimilation of
those Jews who sincerely wished to "renounce their specificity".

The rest would be put into "the ghetto to
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which they aspire ll • 56
French antisemitism, based on this xenophobic fear
of "particularism ff and on resentment of the control exercised by Jews over the economy and government, resulted in
laws passed in October, 1941, which defined as Jewish anyone with Jewish grandparents, excluded Jews from all government service and limited the percentage of Jews in
various professions,}lwi th the exception of World War I
veterans.

Later, the citizenship of Jews who had immi-

grated to France as early as 1930 was revoked, foreign Jews
were rounded up into work camps, and a program of the
f1aryanization" of Jewish enterprise, initiated by the
Germans but followed through on by the French, took place
in Paris.
Laval described the laws regulating the situation of
the Jews as "the cruellest burden which the conqueror
obliged us to bear".57

However, Paxton claims that he was

"unable to turn up any direct German order for French antiMasonic, anti-Semitic, or other legislation during the most
active period of Vichy legislation in 1940H.5 8 Xavier
Vallet, the Commissioner General for Jewish Affairs in
1940-1942 wrote from his prison after the war, "There are
those who believed that this law was the result of pressure
by the occupation authorities on the French government.
• • • The Alibert law. • • owes nothing at all to nazism
(and was rather) spontaneous and indigenous, issued in fact
several days before the first German ordinance. ~~59

The

French probably would have fone no further than these laws
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except that in 1942 the Final Solution began in the West
and Germany set quotas for deportations from France at
100,000.

The Vichy government then participated in the

gruesome roundup of Jews and even, in a somewhat horrifying demonstration of their xenophobia, traded off foreign
refugee Jews to save French Jews.
One final aspect of collaboration remains, one that
colored all the other aspects.

There were those who col-

laborated out of opportunism, or the crude desire to profit from the situation.

Fortunes were made by taking ad-

vantage of the aryanization of Jewish enterprise, producing for the Germans, and acting as spies and informants.
Opportunism also tinged other forms of collaboration.

The

fascist gang leaders attempted, although unsuccessfully,
to use collaboration as a lever to power. l The journalists
and fascist writers used the defeat to take their revenge on all that had

previousl~'frustrated

them.

While

this aspect of collaboration can be overexaggerated, the
official collaboration of the French government essentially
legitamized it.
7

The government's collaboration was a spring-

board for the unofficial collaborators who would not have
had the prestige or publicity they had if not for the official collaborators.

After all, the government was basically

using its country's defeat to accomplish certain ends,
externally to reorder France's alliances and maintain and
even aggrandize their colonial empire at Britain's expense, internally to reshape political,l'economic, and social institutions.
This is important in evaluating the significance of
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collaboration for France.

On the positive side, that Vichy

spared France the worst hardships of total occupation is
debatable.
poned them.

The most that can be said is that Vichy postVichy did, however, sharpen old conflicts,

aggravate internal tensions in the face of a foreign army,
and, because of this, helped to push the country in 1944
into virtual civil warfare, in spite of their desire to
avoid disorder.

Vichy f s existence also led., . . France into

complicity with actions, such as the Final Solution and
repression of the Resistance, normally unthinkable.

In

this respect, the psychological damage done by collaboration was considerable.

Most of the French continue to deny

this aspect of their past, but the sense of guilt and
unease can still be felt.
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Chapter Two
Passive France
Among the people in our class, we were three
groups. Well, there were about thirty students in the class, thus there were three
groups of ten. There was a group really very
collaborationist, a group frankly Gaullist,
and then a group ••• ah ••• that waited to see
what was going to happen.
Dr. Chauvin

This chapter raised the problem of labeling a previously
,,(.tili nl*
unnamed group. I consideredl\this chapter "Neutral France u •
However! the majority of French people were not necessarily
neutral;

they simply did not act on their beliefs, and it

is on this basis that I distinguish them from the collaborators and the resisters.

Therefore, "Passive France" is the

most accurate description of this category between the two
extremes, this group that chose not to choose.
It is difficult to discover exactly what the political
opinions of this majority were, since most citizens did not
write editorials, publish books, or give speeches.

One can

only get at their emotions and reactions through reading personal letters and journals and by talking to people who were
there.

I interviewed fifteen people in Tours, France in an
- ~. ~

'.

.. . .

'

effort to learn more about the reactions of some of this majority to the occupation.

Other difficulties arose, since the

people available for interviewing were all under thirty during
the war, and the opinions of the older sector of the population may have been different.
themselves and others.

Often they contradicted both

The contradictions are significant

~ ""'~~~ \~ ~~~U)71 WCAA vJV'.j;UL~~ ~

both becauseAthey make

ev~dent

inaccuracies of

th~rty-year-old

memories, inaccuracies that are significant in that they show
a sense of unease and guilt.

Certain questions and topics
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were met with defensiveness and edginess that may be due to
their awareness that by not actively opposing

V~chy

ot

the

German Occupation, they were in a sense tacitly collaborating.

Vichy could not have gone as far as it did in external

reorientation or internal social programs had it not had a certain amount of popular consent, if not support.
In any case, at least for the first two years after the
defeat, many people remained in a state of somewhat stunned

ap-

_a.O-?O{\']

athy.

Analyzing~for

doing something can be complex, but ana-

lyzing reasons for not doing anything presents problems all its
own.

Initially, at any rate, the shock of the defeat contrib-

uted greatly to the passivity of the people.

The lightning-

quick German invasion of France in June 1940, after months of
tense inactivity, tore up the lives of millions of French people.
In front of the invading Germans poured a stream of refugees
from Northern France and Belgium.

At the same time, the Ger-

mans were bombing cities, shops closed as the owners hid or left,
newspaper publishing and radio broadcasting stopped.

People's

lives were severely disoriented and they had no clear idea of
what was happening or why.
Since World War I, the French had been led to believe that
their army was unsurpassed in Europe, and that the Maginot Line
had been built as a "super trench" to ward off any invasion

, ·'\ll\t.
i/JU) \ \\CO\~{I'.~\ei ,";)1

from the East.

To be overrun in less than six weeksfito many, yet

for most there was no desire to hold out and fight to the finish.
The destruction and bloodletting of World War I had led to a
strong aversion to war among the French.

Most people simply

wanted an end to the confusion and destruction and a return to
f1normal" conditions, as Narcel Verdier expressed in The Sorrow
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and the Pity:

"Like all the other forty million Frenchmen who

lived through that particular day when I saw our Army routed,
when I saw that the Germans were in Biarritz and that the whole
of France was invaded, and that nothing was to be done about it,
well, I felt as all the others did: there must be someone who
can stop this massacre. u1 In Tours, concern over stopping the
destruction led to a decision by the mayor to declare Tours an
open city to the Germans without having received orders from the
~£ench

government to do so.

The French were humiliated by the de-

feat, a mood captured by Simone de Beauvoirts description of her
journey back to Paris after the armistice had been signed.

"It

was absolutely hellish.

Victory was written across every German
face while every French face proclaimed defeat aloud. tt2 Yet they,

as did the government, preferred to accept defeat than to continue fighting.
They were given a symbol to soothe their fears, Philippe
Petain, the "victor of Verdun", a war hero who promised to
help France regain her position externally and renew herself
internally.

Roger Tounze, a newspaperman in Clermont-Ferrand,

spoke of the effect Petain had on the French.

\lWell, at the

beginning I did not understand anything, just like everybody else.

On June twenty-fourth, in the morning, the lieu-

tenant gave a beautiful speech, and then Marshal P€tain, the
only marshal we had, sued for an armistice.

I knew what an

armistice was, but I did not fully realize what a marshal
was. n3
himself.

The caring father image was emphasized by Petain
" (1941)

should be the year of France's recovery.

It will be if all of you press yourselves close to me.
• • • I have given
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myself to France, that is to say, to all of you. n4
Support for Petain, especially in the first years,
was widespread.

Dr. Chauvin, a high school student in

Tours, spoke of the political divisions among his classmates.

"There were not many collaborators.

On the

other hand, there were partisans of IVlarshal Petruin, many
more than collaborators.

In our class, out of ten who

were for P~tain, there were really only two or three
collaborators, that's all. tl5 This attitude not only shows
that wide support for ~tain existed but that it was not
considered collaborationist.

Most of my interviewees

either did not realize or could not believe that supporting a regime that collaborated with Germany was, in a
sense, collaborating.
mate.

In any case, Vichy seemed legiti-

The Chamber of Deputies had voted full powers to

P~tain, and, as L'Abbe Labaume explained, Jlcertain emmi-

nent jurists thought that Marshal Petain's power was
legitimate, and other emminent jurists • • • asserted that
the Marshal Petain was illegitimate in this government.
So how were we to decide?U 6 How were ordinary citizens
to decide this?
cide;

My impression is that they did not de-

they simply accepted what existed.

Madame Solange,

in The Sorrow and the Pity, admitted she was petainiste.
ttl

was for the J.l.1arshal, I don t t know.

I wasn't political. "

When asked what her support stemmed from she replied,
"Well, ma,be it was the Marshal's ideas. • • what he wanted
to do for France.

And I thought he was a very fine man."?

Petain was a symbol of France's days of glory, a
father figure, someone people would trust with France's
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destiny.

Support for the Vichy regime was also urged

by the Church.

Archbishop Fellin of Bordeaux, in June,

1940, urged the French, "Be thus united around our flag
in mourning. • • and under the authority of those. who legitimately hold power. uS

In spite of the decline of Ca-

tholicism in twentieth-century France, it still was a
significant social force.

The Church's support of Vichy

thus gave it moral legitimacy and for this reason it is
significant that the Archbishop of Tours accompanied the
mayor and the prefect to surrender to the Germans.

When

I asked L'Abbe Labaume, himself a resistor, about the
role of the Archbishop in Tours, he answered that "they
(the archbishops) had a people to support, to animate,
to protect also, you see.

An imprudent action on their

part brought on serious consequences;

thus it was neces-

sary for one thing that they be very prudent.,,9
There was also, especially during and after the invasion, a revival of religiosity.

Some Catholics inter-

preted the defeat and occupation as punishment for France's
sins.

Archbishop Fellin felt that ttif we have been con-

quered, it is maybe that we were no longer sufficiently
supported at the bottom of our souls by this triple ideal
which is three large realities:
Family".10

God, the Fatherland, the

The increase in religiosity led to the publish-

ing of a collection of 322 invocations to saints according
to the nature of the demand made.
as Lourdes were crowded.

Pilgrimage spots such

Another interesting phenomenon

took place in 1943, Le Grand Retour.

The statue of Notre

Dame of Boulogne was smuggled across the demarcation line
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in a truck and brought to Lourdes.

It then was brought

by missionaries from village to village, while pilgrims
consecrated themselves with a sign of penance.
of Sorrow, pray for France who suffers;

"Our Lady

Our Lady of

Sorrow, pray for France who has sinned.,,11

1/Uring this

expedition, over five million souvenir pictures and one
and a half million rosaries were sold. 12
The majority of the people were passive for another
important reason.

France was being occupied, directly in

the North, by a foreign army.

Attitudes towards Germany

and the Germans were confused.

In 1940 Germany seemed

invincible.

England was the only country left opposing

Germany, and faith in her ability to hold out was poor.
Lack of hope combined with the shock of the defeat kept
people from actively opposing the Germans.

Dr. Chauvin,

a student in Tours, felt that "anyway, there some very
difficult moments because • • • Germany was a very solid
country • • • people had to have a certain kind of admiration because it was, even so, a very well organized, very
disciplined, very solid country.n13

However, he did not

think at the time "that it was allover, that we had the
Germans on our backs forever, not that, no!ff 14 When I
asked Madame Fournier, a secretary, if it seemed in 1940
as if the Germans were there to stay, she responded, "Oh,
no, we always thought they would leave, and as soon as
possible and right away.

We never thought it would last

five years • • • We always had the hope that they would
leave, that they would leave.

That's why we still had
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the courage to live. u 15

Although they never lost hope

that the Germans would leave, they never saw themselves
personally as having anything to do with getting r[d of
the Germans.

Mr. Martin, who worked as a typesetter at

the local paper in Tours, illustrated this passive waiting for someone to come liberate France.

"We had this

idea that we were going to be liberated, that one day the
war would be over, but in what way? • • • We didn't know
how we could get out of it because we didn't quite see
how they would be able to make a landing. u16
Doubtless, another reason why few direct anti-German
actions were taken, although the French people wanted
the Germans out and did not lose hope that they would
leave, was simply fear of the Germans.

In 1940, there

was never any question that northern France was being
occupied, whiah the first paper to appear in Tours after
the armistice made very clear.

All cars, trucks, and

firearms were requisitioned, there was a curfew from
8:00 PM to 6:00 AM and a total blackout after dark,
there was no drawing, sketching, or photographing in the
streets without express permission of the German Commandant, no listening to the radio or singing in the streets
or in homes, no gatherings of more than two in the streets.
Even the clocks were all reset to German time.

Iv1adame

X, who asked that her name not be used, felt that nit was
always very painful to see this German constraint over
our lives.

This is what those who have never been occu-

pied can never comprehend • • • All the same we spent four
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years under the German boot." 17

Madame Fournier, a sec-

retary, also commented on the constant fear inspired by
the parading soldiers.

nAnd when we saw a German, we
were always afraid of him, we trembled. u18
However, talk of fear of the Germans may have been a
rationalization.

Madame Fournier, who trembled at the

sight of a German, worked in an office run by Germans.
When I asked her about this, she became quite agitated.
nYes, but there the Germans were everywhere, they were
in the administration, in the mayorts office • • • they
were the ones who commanded, sure • • • they were the
ones who were in charge of everything • • • there was the
army, there were the civilians • • • You see, they were
the leaders, so we were forced to be under their domination and to work with them.,,19

Madame X said she and

her husband were called collaborators by their neighbors
because they had housed a German officer.

I asked her

if she considered herself a collaborator.

"Absolutely

not !

We didnft consider ourselves collaborators.

couldn't close your house to the Germans.
lutely necessary to receive them.

You

It was abso-

It was okay to shoot

the Germans in the back, but norto oppose them face to
face like that. We couldn't do that at all, at all, at
all! fl 20 Dr. Chauvin also expressed the belief that they
could not directly oppose the Germans.

"They had force.

They arrested people and deported people to Germany • • •
What could you do against that?

Organize clandestinely,

okay, but direct action against the Germans, no! It was
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not possible. ,,21
One scene in The Sorrow and the Pity illustrates that
sometimes this fear was not based on an actual threat or
risk.

M. Dionnet was a schoolteacher in Clermont-Ferrand.
Dionnet: People came to this flagraising ceremony against their will, you
understand. It was a • • •
But they came anyway?
Dionnet: Well, they had to, in times
like that. You begin to realize • • • you
understand what people are really like,
you know, how fear prevails, with very few
exceptions.
Did they actually run any risk for
not attending?
Dionnet:
did. 22

No, but they thought they

The presence of Germans and the restrictions they
imposed were objective reasons for fear.

Yet the over-

reaction of the interviewees to my questions, their constant insistence on having to work with the Germans or
else be arrested, on having been forced to obey, gave me
the impression that this fear was a kind of self-justification for not having done anything.

This impression is

furthered by the fact that in 1940 through

-j

942 the Ger-

mans were not particularly harsh in Tours, as my interviewees themselves admit.

Mr. Martin, a typesetter,

stated that at first, "outside of the curfew, let's say
that life was relatively ••• normal, that is for a time of
war. u 23 A prefect report for the Eure Department, wri tten in 1940, claimed that t1in spite of all this (the material destrQction) the state of mind of the population
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in general is excellent and its rapports with the occupiers
are marked by dignity and correctness.

No incidents have

been signaled to me and I must recognize that a very strict
discipline appears to have been imposed on the German
troops. ,,24
The people I spoke with seemed to respect the Germans
they knew personally.

Occasionally I was

l~ft

completely

bewildered by the abruptness of the change in tone.

Af-

ter her long tirade about being under German domination
and being forced to work with the Germans, Madame Fournier told me, "But they were reasonable, those who occupied the offices.

They were reasonable.

They weren't

mean, they weren't severe, they weren't so terrible.
Things went pretty smoothly,tf 25 Perhaps the reality itself was contradictory - the fear created by parading
soldiers, restrictions, and arrests on the one side and
the basic humanity seen with one-to-one contact on the
other.

Madame Guinvarch, whose husband was a policeman

in Tours, told me of the day she was out walking with her
baby in a carriage when a German soldier stopped her,
picked up and embraced the child, then explained that he
had just received news that his wife and children had
been killed in a bombing.
couldn't say they hated us.

"But really, the Germans, you
They were our friends.,,26

Alongside this humanity was a deep respect for the "correctness·1 and politeness of the Germans.

The French (Y\id~le.. class

valuef the formalities of politeness highly,

and

the

Germans were praised for being "clean, impeccable, always very polite,n 27 as Madame Fournier described them.

f'ladame X referred to the (ferman officer quartered at their
house as "our German(l and said, "He was a very correct
man, very nice, indeed very much like us".28

The June

23, -1940, entry in Mr. Chollet's journal of the events
of the German invasion illustrated this admiration with
the discomfort it brought.

Hr. Chollet was approached

by a German who asked him, "in a most correct French and
a very courteous tone of voice, where he would be able
to procure a guide to Franco-German conversation.
dicated the address of a bookstore.

I in-

While he transcribed

it in his notebook, I complimented him for the manner in
which he expressed himself in our language. • • pushing
politeness to the fullest, he thanked me in excellent
terms and extended his hand.

I avoided his gesture with

a curt military salute, which seemed to disconcert him.
He did not insist and turned away, his hand to his cap.tt 29
Correct French and politeness on the one hand and force
and power on the other created this peculiar mixture of
fear and respect.
Attitudes towards the Germans shifted noticeably
after 1942, for a combination of reasons.

First, as

Mr. Martin explained, "as the years passed, we realized
that first of all life was becoming more and more difficult fl • 30 Conditions did worsen; shortages of food, electricity, and fuel became quite severe.

rtoger Martin du

Gard wrote to Andre Gide in September, 1942, "Itm not
writing to you to w4ine about the food situation.

All

the same, things have reached such a point, in a region,
that it must be talked about.

Three and four days in a
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row have passed where there has been nothipg in the markets.
not

§

I say nothing literally.

Not

~

single vegetable,

single fruit • • • There are entire families who

have nothing more than their bread rations to eat every
day.n31

The Germans also became harsher with the French.

In November, 1942, all of France was directly occupied.
That year also saw the start of massive Jewish deportations from France, and in 1943 compulsory labor was instituted.

The increase in German severity toward the

French is also noticeable in these figures from the Indreet-Loire Department, of which Tours is the capitol.

Year

Arrested

1940
';941
1942
1943
1944
indet.
total

22
136
519
584
604

Shot,
executed, or
tortured
to death

..J.i

'1944

0
1

30
12
33
t

76

Interned
20
106
195
215
125
0

m

Deported 32
2
29
354
364
446
14
1207

The reasons for this increase were partly external.
Mr. Martin explained that illife became more difficult

from the time that the Germans felt that for them, if
you like, the game was up.

And then, when they had the

Russian front, that gave them a~ot of trouble.

In every

corner they felt a little bit ••• like they were losing
ground ••• and they took it out on the countries where
they had installed themselves. tl33 In June, 1941, a prefect report for the Eure Department made note of the
ftimmense hope (of those who only live in the hope and in
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anticipation of a return to the previous state of affairs)
at the news that Russia in turn has entered into the
struggle n • 34 Although, like the collaborators, many of
those who remained passive feared a Russian victory as
the triumph of Communism, still Russia's entry signalled
the beginning of the end for Germany.

The report also

examined the population's response to English aggression
in Syria.

At first it created anger and confusion but

quickly things settled down.

"The entrance of General

de Gaulle in Beyreuth will certainly be saluted in my
district by an explosion of joy ••• controlled.,,35

As the

tide turned against Germany hopes were raised, "especially
from the time Russia entered the war • • • We thought that
the same thing would happen to Hitler that had happened
to Napoleon.

And after, when America entered the war,
well then ••• ,, 36 With the possibility that Germany could
be defeated, more people entered the resistance, which,
although still a minority, became increasingly militant,
which in turn led to increasing harshness by the Germans,
and so on.

By 1943 opinion had shifted decisively

towards the Allies, yet there was still

n~

real threat

to the Germans.
The majority remained passive, not only due to fear
of the Germans, but also due to a preoccupation with
their own and their families' survival.

Just getting

by from day to day was a chore that required a great deal
of time and energy.
primary concern:

Everyone I spoke to agreed on the
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Dr. Chauvin:

tlOh, yes, that was it, the number one

preoccupation, eating, because really, we were very hungry. We were very thin. u37
Mme Fournier:
was food.
isn't it?
Mme X:

"That which we missed principally

It's really the hardest thing to do without,
We didn't have much to eat. tt38

"The deprivation that was really something
was the deprivation of food. n39
"What was the main preoccupation of people at that
time, according to you?' .
Marcel Verdier:

uFood, food!,,40

Food shortage, the result of the loss of 700,000
French peasants to German POW camps, poor distribution,
hoarding, and German requisitions, became a serious problem.

Paxton writes that "France eventually was the worst

nourished of the Western occupied nations,,41 and estimated caloric intake to have "descended as low as 1500
calories a day where there was access to black market
supplies and even lower for city populations where there
was not tt • 42 Thus, simply getting enough food was a com-

plex, tiring process which involved knowing which tickets
were good on what day and getting up early and standing
for hours in lines.

The French often tried to augment

their legal ration, frequently by riding out to the countryside, to the farm of a friend or relative, and buying
produce directly from them.

A black market also developed

which involved selling restricted food at exorbitant
prices of selling ration tickets.

For this Alfred Fabre-
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Luce described the Frenchman as a "losing profiteer • • •
He diminishes his own ration by trying to better it.
Forty million resourceful ones are proud of having played
tricks on each other. n43
Those who , had access to food,
ticular, hoarded all they could.

shopk~epers

in par-

Jean Dutourd, in his

novel Au Bon Beurre, describes a middle class shopkeeper
family that owned a cremery and profited so well from
black market buying and selling, watering down the milk
and cream, and so on, that they ate huge meals out of
spite.

They now had power over the people they supposedly

served.

Although Au Bon Beurre is fiction, a prefect

report for 1942 also described this phenomenon.

"Those

who do not need to fear material difficulties because,
really, they are making profits off of the economic dtsorder, reveal a scorn for all morality • • • The merchant,
the entrepeneur who enriches himself by means of the occupation, desires a life that corresponds to his gains.
This one here does not steal, he traffics • • • He is
lavish and buys all that is sold.,,44.
Food was not the only item in short supply.

Cigar-

ettes, oil, coal, electricity, and so on, were also
rationed.
cation.

Buying a new pair of shoes required an appliThe French often displayed ingenuity in getting

by without these items.

Old garden hoses were used as

bicycle tires, a necessary vehicle because there were no
cars.

Homemade butter churns were constructed to con-

vert some of the milk ration to butter.

A product called
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Filpas was sold to replace stockings.

The women painted

it on their legs to give the appearance of nylon.

The

variety of plants that were dried and smoked to augment
the "decade" (ten days worth) of cigarettes gives credit
to the French imagination - anything from corn silk and
rose leaves to artichokes.

Old clothes were repaired
",.

A

rather than replaced, and La Depeche

•

~n

Tours printed

an article about new fabrics that were designed.
This summer, clothes made of vegetable
fabric will be worn. Dresses or suits
of woml or cotton will be as rare as
they will be out of style ••• These new
fabrics are not unpleasant. They are
soft to the touch, supple, and hold
up well ••• So goes the mode. Late comers will risk wearing an old-fashioned
kind of fabric, ana5to be "a la modell,
what won't one do.
Thus, simple daily life was no longer simple but a
source of constant worry.

People were physically uncom-

fortable, hungry, and cold, but their frustrations affected them on a deeper, internal level.

Madame X described

it as "something that is quite spiritual, but that is a
part of the most important part of our ideas, of our dispositionstt. 46 This constant anxiety helps explain a phenomenon most difficult to understand, denunciations.
Baudot described those who wrote letters of denunciation
as limen and women pushed by hatred an¢! by vengeance or
again by the lure of pay for treason".47

While hatred

'and vengeance did playa role, this explanation is too
simplistic to satisfy me.

It makes it easy to categorize

those who denounced as spiteful or greedy, not like the
rest of them.

Dr. Chauvin was allowed to look over the
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letters of denunciation in the archives of Tours.

Most

often they were written "for stupid reasons • • • People
wrote to the Germans to denounce their neighbors who had
badly camouflaged their lights. ,,48

Baudot also mentions

that the Germans paid little attention to these letters,
and threw them out or handed them over to French authorities.

That there were so many of such minor importance

that the Germans simply threw them out indicates a more
complex motivation.

They were a manifestation of the

constant stress and tremendous anxiety produced by the
difficulties of life, by fear of the Germans, and perhaps
by a sense of unease that they were not doing anything.
Writing a letter could have been a way of taking out
these feelings and of performing an action that, while
it

no d:ik

incurre~,

masked self-concern as the concern of a good

French citizen.

(If the person next door does not cam-

ouflage his lights, we may all be killed by a bomb.)
This tension and anxiety also had its lighter manifestations.

If the French did nothing else, they did

make fun of themselves and everyone else, as in this joke
which compares the behavior of parachutists of various
nationalities.
The Germans jump from the plane at
the first command: flHeraus! n.
The English start by taking their
tea and marmalade, smoking a cigarette,
and then deciding to jump for the King,
for His Gracious Majesty • • •
The Italians calmly throw their parachutes into the empty space and don't
follow them.
The French complain: flIt's always
the same ones who get themselves killed •
• • • Isn't a shame to nominate fathers
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for such a job! " Finally, under the
insistence of the officer, who calls
on their sense of honor, they jumP.49
But they don't have parachutes.
This joke could have been inspired by the situation in
1940:

the Germans who attacked quickly, the English, who

reacted slowly and calmly, the Italians, who entered in
word but not in action, and the French, who entered reluctantly only to find themselves unprepared.
Jokes are an excellent indication of the concerns
and preoccupations of the population.

They were also a

form of defense against demoralization and despair, a form
of resistance, although still passive resistance, to propaeanda, and offered a release of tension.

The most fre-

quent jokes were about the food situation, rationing,
shortages, and lines.

Even Le Cri du Peuple, a fascist

newspaper, carried cartoons mocking the situation, but
they were usually pretty poor humor.

For example, a mother

was shown talking to her daughter, saying, fllf you had
accepted the owner of the spice store on the corner's
proposal of marriage, now I wouldn't have to stand in line. ,,50
A street joke about lines was somewhat more sarcastic.
A man to a pregnant woman:
"Vous l'avez eu sans ticket? "
Woman's response:
tlOui, mais quelle queue! ,,51

-

An extended joke about rationing was Marcel Ayme's The
Life Ration (extracts from the diary of Jules Flegmon).
It mocks the government's moralizing tone in its efforts
to ration.

"In order to avoid the risk of serious shor-

tages, and to ensure a high margin of productivity, the
Government • • • intends to abolish all unproductive and
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useless elements in the population • • • Of course there
is no question of actually putting useless mouths to
death.

The idea is simply to ration their living time.

They're to be entitled to so many days of existence a
month. tt52 The Life Rati.Q!!. also makes fun of the justification of black market buying and the extremes to which
it is carried.

People do not simply buy enough days to
,

make up a month but exorbitant amounts if they can afford
b\o,\:,k rro{"\:~t

bov,<\l\f"

it, such as a man who 1,967 days in one month.
,I'

"

Eventu-

ally the situation reaches the point that life cards are
abolished.
Jokes about Germans were also common.

Many of them

compensate for the inner sense of humiliation felt by
the French by showing a subtly superior Frenchman making
a fool out of a dumb German, as in this joke:
Every morning a Fritz bought his paper
from the same merchant who, knowing
that he didn't know our language, said
to him with a big smile: "'Ile11, here
it is, your daily, grand con!U
The German inquired as to the meaning of this word from a Frenchman who
explained to him, "Grand con is the familiar diminutive for Grand Conqueror."
The next day the German responded
to the merchant, "No, not grand can, me
Ii ttle £.Q!! ••• It and add.ed with a liig§
arm salute, lfHitler, him grand con!" 3
'"
As for the National Revolution, npetain
preaches to us

a return to the soil.

At 85 years of age he could well

indeed give the example. u54
Up to now I have examined various motives for the
lack of action, such as respect for Petain, religiosity,
fear of the Germans, and preoccupation with survival.
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The simplest explanation should not be forgotten.
doing anything was the easiest thing to do.

Not

Conditions

were bad, but not bad enough to push people over the
border of inertia.

There was a basic political apathy.

The issues were complex and often people acted without
thinking issues through to their conclusions

o~

consider-

ing the larger perspective into which their actions fit.
Roger Tounze, a newspaperman in Clermont-Ferrand, when
he found out that a Jewish friend of his had been dismissed, "began to get angry, to rebel;
ing some questions • • • ,,55

(he) started ask-

Most of the French did not

ask themselves questions, as in the case of Marius Klein,
who did not rebel against the persecution ' of Jewish shopkeepers but placed an ad in the paper stating that he was
not Jewish so that he would not get hurt by it. 56
Not thinking through questions was reinforced by
what was central motive for remaining passive.

Many French

did not see or did not allow themselves to see alternatives.

They felt "so isolated, so powerless",57 as Si-

mone de Beauvoir responded to Sartre's insistence that
they act.

Their daily lives were difficult and usually

preoccupied them and kept them from facing a direct confrontation with difficult issues.

Yet they usually proved

passive when confrontations did arise.

Madame Guinvarch's

husband was a policeman in Tours during the war, and the
French police were responsible for arresting Jews and resistors.

When I asked Madame Guinvarch what her husband

did with the French police, she answered,
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Oh, yes, they were obliged to be
police. Often, when a policeman was
told such-and-such a person will be
arrested tomorrow morning he tried to
warn this person ••• Sometimes they were
too late. The second time, the policeman was forced to ••• how shall I
say? ••
She then trailed off and switched back to:
Besides, the French police were under
the control of the German police.
They were under their control, but58
they really worked for the French.
Mr. Guinvarch thought of secretly warning people who were
to be arrested, but did not consider or rejected the option
of refusing, resigning, or joining the resistance.

As

with most people in this category, the risk was too high.
In this case a wife and children depended on his income.
This was also true of Mr. Martin, who was drafted into
the forced labor program to work in Germany.

At this

point many young Frenchmen joined the resistance rather
than work in Germany, but Mr. Martin had a wife and a
child on the way.

Politically, his feelings were not

strong one way or the other.

He did not mind the work

in Germany as he ended up with an easy job at the post
office.

Six months later he was given permission to re-

turn to France to see his daughter, at which point he
"arranged" to be able to stay, but from the way he talked
it seemed to be more for the sake of convenience than
from any aversion to working for the Germans.
This blindness to alternatives is also illustrated
in the scene from The Sorrow and the Pity where two schoolteachers discuss the dismissal of a Jewish colleague •.
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M. Danton: Well, if I may add a word,
take the case of Never. I think we
tried to find him some private tutoring. The same went for another colleague who had been dismissed. But
as you say, it wasn't much; but still
I think there was some sympathy. Yes,
there was.
When you say, ffWhat could we do'?",
what do you mean'? Ultimately, you
could have offered a collective resignation from the ltoei' couldn't you'?
M. Dionnet:
We 1, that was out
of the question. You don*t have any
understanding of ~eachers ••• collec- 59
tive resignation, come on,.!
The risk of such alternatives was too high.

Most

people lost materially less by accepting the situation
with its lesser unpleasantness.

However, they did

10S6

self-respect as they ended up making choices they would
have preferred not to make.

In any similar situation the

majority of people can well be expected to act this way.
The motives of protecting one's life and family, and avoiding arrest]at times like that, challenges in themselves,
are certainly not uniquely French.

It takes a tremendous

push to overcome most peoples' desire to live their lives
normally and leave political matters aside.

The larger

questions were distant and difficult to perceive in their
proper perspective at the time, and matters were confused
by the existence of a French state that called on the
people to return to normal and accept the occupation.
When confronted individually with a choice, by being requisitioned for forced labor or being called upon to
arrest a compatriot, many chose to remain passive, not
because they were pro-German, but because they had not
thought out the ultimate consequences of their actions,
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or at least their sense of responsibility to themselves
took priority over any sense of collective responsibility
for France.

It is this which explains the sense of guilt

and unease, the defensiveness I encountered, and the
creation
turn.

o~

the "myth of the Resistance" to which I now
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Chapter Three
The Resistance

From the very start the Resistance was
a question of outlook, even more, of
character ••• The Resistance was faithful
to all the great principles for which
men have lived and, when necessary,
died. The Resistance was a refusal to
compromise.
Georges Bidault

The choices open to the French people obviously were
not limited to collaboration or passivity.

Resistance,

and by this I mean active opposition to the German Occupiers and the French collaborators, was a third option.
Resisters were members of mpvements or networks that committed acts of sabotage and guerilla warfare, wrote and
distributed underground tracts and newspapers, helped
escapees, gathered information for the Allies, etc •••. The
Resistance was both an external and an internal phenomenon.
Externally, it was launched by General Charles de Gaulle
on June 18, 1940, two days after Petain had asked the
Germans for an Armistice, with a now legendary radio announcement.
I, General de Gaulle, now 1n London,
calIon all French officers and men
who are at present on British soil,
or may be in the future, with or without arms; I calIon all engineers and
workmen from the armaments factories
who are at present on British soil, or
may be in the future, to get in touch
with me.
Whatever happens, the flame of
French resistance must not and shal1 1
not die.
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The movement he launched, called the Free French, consisted primarily of military men, sailors and soldiers
from Dunkirk and members of the colonial administration
whos e fidelity to de Gaulle was complete.

Being career

soldiers, they had an inaptitude for and a distrust of
clandestine warfare and tended to seethe struggle in
terms of traditional armies.

They were wary also of

the revolutionary effervescence of the internal Resistance.

Within France the Resistance, like collaboration,

was hardly a monolithic movement.

Groups and networks

formed and reformed, were broken up by loss of members.
It was rare that a particular network survived all four
years or that a movement operated in both zones at the
same time.

Because of the need for secrecy, often groups

were not even aware of each other.

The activities of

these diverse groups fell into three basic categories.
Direct anti-German action involved sabotage, assassination, cutting telephone wires, and other semi-military
measures.

Aiding de

involved transmitting infor-

Gau~e

mation on the Germans to London, printing false papers,
setting up routes for crossing the demarcation line or
the English Channel.

Finally, writing tracts for news-

papers or posters was a way of counteracting the constant
Vichy propaganda •
.:r..n ..J~ fJor1itf(\ 'lD()e-Hvu-~ \,\9Qrc
~The Liberation-~,

fr dYlafl (YIDVUt'leJ)15 .
formed by socialists and synt:OIj{'

dicalists, put out a paper and worked with de Gaulle, as
did the

~

de !s Resistance, whose members tended to-

wards the political right.

The Organization Civile et
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Militaire was made up of soldiers and civil servants who
placed themselves in important administrative posts where
they were able to gather information useful to the Allies.
The Front Nationale, which consisted of the reserves of
the Communist Party, was the only movement both political
and military that worked simultaneously in both zones.
Alongside these were several smaller groups of students
and intellectuals.

These smaller groups usually did not

last long because they were either decimated by the Germans or swallowed into larger movements.
In the South the major movements were:

Combat, a

group of officers, engineers, and bureaucrats, usually
Christian Democrats, who gathered information and wrote
tracts,

Liberation-~,

a group of syndicalists, social-

ists, and communists who centered their writings on antifascism and worked at mobilizing the masses, which they
reproached Combat, a more elitist group, for ignoring,
and Franc-Tireur, a group of intellectuals, ~lh:s l.ren, mostly
Communists) who at first only published a newspaper, then
became an organized sabotage group that worked with de
Gaulle.and the Allies in London.
Although there were a large number of movements,
Henri Michel advises us not to be misle/d.

"Active 11.e-

sisters were never more than a minority and at the start
a tiny minority.n 2 Often one person had a multitude of
pseudonyms, which also gave a misleading impression of
numbers.

It is difficult to pin down the exact numbers

for the Resistance.

Paxton figures that "after the war
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some 300,000 Frenchmen received official veteran's status
for active Resistance service:

130,000 as deportees and

another 170,000 as ' Resistance volunteers;· This brings
the total of active aesistance participation at its peak,
at least as

officia~/recognized

after the war, to about

two percent of the adult French population. tl3

Bre'e and

Bernauer claim that 30,000 Resisters were executed and
115,000 deported, whereas Nichel wrote that 20,000 were

shot and ',00,000 deported.

In any case the numbers dis-

prove the "myth of the Resistance", a myth created after
the war as a kind of collective white lie to ease consciences.

Since the Hesisters proved to be the IIgood

guys" on the right, or winning, side, many who did not
resist, even if they did not collaborate, did not wish
to admit that they had had neither the foresight nor the
courage to resist.

They have rewritten their personal

and national past until it would appear as if everyone
lead a double life and the Resistance was a mass movemente

Emile Couladon, called Colonel Gaspar while serving

as the head of the Auvergne maquis, remarked with frustration, "The thing which amazes me most when I talk to
people who I know very well supported Petain is • • •
they all tell me how they did their share for the Resistance.

They've all done one thing or another, there's

always something they can think of • • • Sometimes it's
quite incredible:

'Well, if you only knew, Monsieur Gas-

par, if I told you what I did ••• '

And so I say:

out

with it, corne on , tell me, tell me all about it." 4
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The question of why so few people resisted has been
dealt with in the first two chapters.
is, why did anyone at all resist?

The question now

The risks were incred-

ibly high, taking Paxtonis figures - over half of the
Resisters either lost their lives or were deported.

What

types of people were willing to take these risks and what
motivated them?

The ltesisters were, as were the collab-

orators, shaped by their prewar experiences.

Chapter

One described the division of France during the 1930's
into two opposing camps, the conservatives and the fas-

cists on one side and a left wing coalition called the
Popular Front on the other.

Tensions erupted during the

Depression into a virtual civil war, and when Petain took

over in 1940, a large body of the population disillusioned
\IIli

th the Third Republic proved ready to follow him.

Jean

Gu€henno sensed the role this prewar split played in ",940.
The defeat of France is only one episode
of the European Civil War. Beneath the
conflict between nations lies a deeper
social conflict. Each nation is so sharply divided within itself that some one
of the parties that compose it can think
that their country's loss is their gain.
Thus, for some groups of Frenchmen, the
misfortune of France is such a victory
as they had no longer dared to hope for.
The Republic had lost; therefore, they 5
have won.
In the same way the prewar split paved the path tOJresistance for some political groups.

Certain members of the

Popular Front, socialists such as Leon Blum, had already
come around to accepting the idea that pacifism in certain cases would have to be sacrificed and that the threat
of fascism warranted a fight.

After the Armistice labor
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unions were outlawed and their members suddenly found
themselves members of illegal organizations forced underground to continue.

These clandestine labor organizations

proved to be a large and important part of the Resistance.

The Communists, for different reasons, followed

a similar but more round-about path, from joining the
Popular Front and calling for a firm stand against fascism in 1935 to denouncing the war as an imperialistic
conflict in 1939 (in response to which Prime Minister
Daladier declared them illegal and forced them underground)
and eventually, with the German invasion of the Soviet
Union in 1941, to joining the Resistance in full strength.
While they were late in joining, they soon took over the
initiative in direct

anti~German

activities and they lost

the highest percentage of their members to execution and
deportation.
A large number of those who resisted had been forced
underground and were already outcasts of society.
had less to lose by resisting than did the
members of society.

They

better~off

Emmanuel dtAstier de la Vigerie,

creator of the movement Liberation-Sud, explained,
I'm going to say something nasty about
my friends and myself: I think you
could only have joined the Resistance
i f you were maladjusted ••• lt's impossible to imagine a government minister,
or a colonel, or an executive becoming
a real partisan, a resister; if they're
successful in their lives, then they'll
be equally successful in dealing with 6
Germans or Englishmen or Russians.
People with less of a stake in society resisted, including
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a large number of workers.

Denis Rake, a British secret

agent in ?rance during the war, remembered that
the greatest help I received came from
railroad workers and Oommunists. French
workers were terrific, they would do anything, they would give you their last
penny if you had no money ••• But the middle class was scared. Of course they
had more to lose and I think in life one
takes into account what one has to lose I had no relatives, I wasn't married.
That's why I did that kind of work - what 7
difference did it make after all?
Along with the workers, Communists, socialists, and
syndicalists, the Resistance included a "particularly high
proportion of France's intellectuals and men of letters " .8
Left-wing intellectuals like Jean-Paul Sartre, Jean

Gu~

henno, and Louis Aragon felt called upon to act according
to their philosophies.

There were several movements which

consisted of university students, such as Defense

~

!§

France and the Musee de l'Homme, a group created by several young ethnologists, most of whom eventually gave up
their lives.

Henri Michel saw this among the long-term

contributions of the .ii.esistance, that it "asserted and
revealed the quality of character in those Frenchmen previously inclined to intellectualism at the Rxpense of
practical activity".9
As the war continued, the composition of the Resistance changed and expanded to include new outcasts created
by the imposition of the Service de Travail Obligatoire,
a program of forced labor in Germany.

Michel explains

this flood of recruits as men who had been too young in
1940 to make a choice.

I tend to see them as men who

before 1943 had not been forced to make a choice. In any
case, by March, 1944, an estimated 35,000 men 10 had responded to the call of La France.
r·lake for the mountains!
the thousands, young Frenchmen are
refusing to leave for Germany. By
the thousands, the "deserters" from
deportation who tomorrow will be the
soldiers of liberation are taking to
the mountains of Savoie, the IVIassif
Central, the Jura, and the Var. It
is a magnificent stand, an awakening
of our people to shout "no" to the 11
Nazi tyrants.
By

The Resistance continued to grow throughout 1943.
By 1944, as it became increasingly evident that the end

was approaching for Germany, more and more tlattentists ",
often contemptuouslY referred to by long-term Resisters
as "September resisters·!, joined the B.esistance.

Because

de Gaulle was essentially a conservative, another interesting turnabout occurred.

"As the time of liberation

approached, bringing the prospect of serious disorders
and indeed the possibility of civil war, the same conservative social forces that had established and supported
the Vichy regime ; • •• , rested upon the General their
hopes of avoiding anarchy after the occupier's departure. u12
Yet the core of the Resistance remained those people
on the other end of the political spectrum from the collaborators, those who were persecuted and had little to
lose, undoubtedly an important catalyst in their willingness to resist.

However, the idealistic and moral nature

of th e Resistance must not be overlooked.

As Michel

points out, the L\esistance was an army of volunteers,
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and such an army needs to feel that it is fighting for
a just cause. 13 The Vichy press constantly referred to
them as bandits and terrorists and called on true Frenchmen to follow the Vichy leaders, who were serving France's
best interests.

The Resistance had to devalue this propa-

ganda to keep up its own morale and to let people inside
and outside of France know that there was another France
that did not support Vichy policies.
wrote Jean
us.

Gu~henno.

npetain is not France " ,

"Petain and Laval do not speak for

Their word is not binding on us and is powerless

to dishonor us.«14
Patriotism was the foremost motivation.

From de

Gaulle to the Communists, all resisters shouted, ttVive
la France tf •

"Our country is in mortal peril, let us all

fight to save her",15 wrote de Gaulle.

In a moving let-

ter to his parents, Henri Fertet, sixteen years old and
condemned to death for Resistance activity, wrote, "What
more honorable death could I have?

I am dying voluntarily

for my country • • • Just the same, it is hard to die.
Vive la France. u16
However, patriotism alone is not enough to explain
the decision to resist.

Even the collaborators claimed

to be patriotic and saw themselves as serving France's
interests by preserving the colonial empire, avoiding
total occupation, building a European economic bloc with
Germany at the center, and in general making the best of
a bad situation.

Those who remained passive may have

loved their country, yet they were to a certain extent
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pacified by Vichy propaganda and, in any case, were unwilling to fight and risk their lives for France, especially when a struggle against the Germans seemed hopeless.
The decision to resist went beyond patriotism, or
perhaps it was patriotism of a different nature.
of all, to resist meant not to lose hope.

First

Debu-Bridel,

better known for his pseudonym Vercors, wrote,
Three months ago I longed for death.
And I was not alone in this. As far
as we could see, before us stretched
only a foul abyss ••• How strange all
that seems today when we have so many
reasons for hope ••• But hope and hopelessness are neither reasoning nor 17
reasonable states.
The hope of the i{esistance contrasts so sharply with the
defeatism of the

collab~ators

because the resisters

thought differently about France's situation.

Their hope

was inspired by looking beyond France to what they saw
as the larger global perspective.

The defeat of 1940

was not definitive, as General de Gaulle so clearly put
it,
France has lost a Battle!
But France has not lost the War!18
The way he saw it, "nothing is lost because this war is , I, .f.tH~
hc\1'( !)Of 1e.:r mICe. ~lt1l~e-1 v~
a world war. In the free universe, tremendous forcesA ~
fAts( ~f)rce$ Will crush the enemy. tf 19

Jean Guehenno agreed that "the only

valid measure of the disaster must be on a world scale.
On the world scale, irance is not beaten. u20
:Resisters, with very few exceptions, were anti-fascist, and thus conceding to work with Germany was unthink-

SDt7IlJaJ

r
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able.

They were also a mixture of Left Republicans to

Communists, and so were willing to work with the Russians
and the Anglo-Americans.

Although the relationshop be-

tween de Gaulle and the Allies was often stormy, he never
doubted the importance they would play in liberating France.
flWe are acting in close cooperation with our Allies and
particularly with the British Empire. ,,21

Rather than

condemning England for having deserted France at Dunkirk, he commended England for "having faced Fate alone,
with magnificent courage, in the darkest hourn. 22 To
the United States, he said, "What makes a great nation
is not only vast resources, but also the courage to pledge
all its power and to accept every sacrifice in the service
of an ideal.

You Americans are doing just that, for you
are waging war ff • 23 Finally, the entry of the Soviet Union
in 1941, which the Collaborators used to strengthen their
assertion that Germany was a rampart against bolshevism,
was seen by the Resistance as a great event.
France is with suffering Russia.

"Suffering

Fighting France is with

fighting Russia. n24
Resistance ideology ran counter to nazism, but Resistance writings often played more on the traditional Germanophobia and on the humiliation France was suffering
u~der the German occupation.

~ance had been reduced to

one-third of her size, Alsace had been completely taken
over, inflation and shortages resulted from German requisitions, French soldiers remained in Prisoner-of-War camps,
and after 1943 Frenchmen were forced into labor service,
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deported, and repressed.
" It wasn't enough to see the Germans in Paris - there
had to be Frenchmen to thank them tl ,25 v~ote Pere Duchesne.
To the

Resistance the worst humiliation came not from

the Germans but from those Frenchmen ready to sacrifice
France's honor by allowing the Germans to plunder France
without protest.

They saw through the Vichy gamble and

knew that accepting defeat did not mean the end of France's
suffering and trouble.

The Germans were occupiers, not

partners, and even if the best that could be done was to
bargain with Germany to save what was left, the Vichy
leaders were a disappointment because they could not
accomplish what they had promised.

De Gaulle accused

the Vichy leaders of having "capitulated, yielding to
panic, forgetting honor, delivering the land over to servitude".26

Jean Paulhan wrote of Vichy leaders, ffthey

are a lot of swine 1J ,27 and France D'Abord described Laval
as "the old jerk from Vichy with the Auvergnat, black
teeth, white tie and all n • 28 Hesisters were aware that
they were fighting Vichy as well as

Ger~any.

~efense ~

la France, an underground paper put out by university
students, pointed out that France could not, without losing its honor, evade the "dreadful duty of war • • • The
viels have fallen.
conceal stands out:

The truth that Petain had hoped to
to fight means freedom, to cringe

means slavery.,,29
Freedom was among the fundamental

principle~

could not be sacrificed under any circumstances.

that
The

Resisters were ready to fight and die for their principles,
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and even for smaller, seeningly ftinsignificant things
like a song, a snap of the fingers, a smile ll • 30 Whether
or not the struggle ended in victory, the protest had to
be made.

"You can squeeze a bee in your hand until it

smothersU, wrote Paulhan.t'It will not smother without
having stung you.
is in vain.

It stings in vain, you say.

Yes, it

But if it did not sting you, there would

long ago have been no more bees.,,31

In choosing free-

dom for humanity, and in having the courage to face possible death for their choice, resisters felt a renewed
sense of personal freedom.

Although they were hounded

and persecuted, Marcel Fouch-Degliame, the editor of
~,

~

remembered feeling free from tithe problems of evory-

day life in the same sense that, being outside organized
society, all of society's objectives did not affect us
very much a • 32 Beyond that, Sartre felt that "we have
never been so free as under the German occupation.

We

have lost every right, and above all the right of speech.

i . . Because of this we were free.
penetrated our very thoughts, every
victory.,,33

Since the Nazi venom
tr~thought

was a

For Sartre, each individual resister had

chosen, had decided what values were truly important
to him, and the choice was genuine since it could always
be expressed in terms of Hbetter death than • • • n34
Guehenno agreed with Sartre that the Germans, lIa tyrannical
power, by at.tributing so much to our thoughts, obliges
us to recognize how untoward and irrepressible they are.
It gives us back to ourselves • • • Now they (our thoughts)
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e.re going to begin to cost us something.

That is good. n35

Another fundamental principle was the defense of
human dignity.

For this reason, the deportations of the

Jews aroused disgust and outrage.

It was at thiB point

that the official Catholic Church protested, in an address
of the Cardinals and Archbishops of the Occupied Zone,
to Marshal petain.

"Profoundly moved by what is reported

about the massive arrests of Jews carried out last week,
and about the harsh treatment that was inflicted upon
them, particularly at the Velodrome d'Hiver, we can not
suppress our conscience's outcry,q

It is in the name of

humanity and Christian principles that our voices rise
to protest for the imprescriptible rights of the human
person. 1136

The Cahiers ~ Temoignage Chretien, a group

formed to help Jewish children escape to Switzerland,
put out a tract entitled, "France, Take Heed of Losing
Your Soul n •

It warned Frenchmen about the insidious pro-

cess beginning with the seduction of nazism as a rampart
against bolshevism and a force for order, leading to a
compromise by collaboration and ending with the total
perversion and destruction of

Chris~ian vel~es~

- It called

upon the Christians of France to be prepared to suffer.
"We will not stop opposing the triumph of Nazi principles
whatever form they are clothed in • • • If some of the
stones that hit Jesus touch us, don't be surprised.
proves we are with him.

It

But above all, let us not join,

let us never join, to save ourselves, with those who throw
the stones. u37
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Those who resisted on moral grounds saw that the
first step in the destruction of morality was allowing
oneself to be compromised by allowing evil without protest.

Defense

~

la France wrote, "To accept in silence

the wrong that had been done you may be a sign of greatr
ness of soul or of saintliness.

But to allow evil to

be done without protest • • • in the name of Christian
charity or humaneness, is vile and hypocritical weakness. ,, 38

1

c}l1J.( it

As for

Christi~

the Radio Vatican reminded France in

1941, i'There are times when one must not cede - when
justice dominates charity because the charity that sacrificelS justice is a bad charity.,,39
~hese

principles even justified social disorder.

To the collaborators, disorder and "terrorism" were the
highest evil to be avoided at all costs, a primary motive
for collaborating and for aiding the Germans in the repression of the Resistance.

Marcel Fouch-Degliame, the

editor of Combat, knew that lIin general the establishment
considered us extrenely dangerous individuals.

Really,

they thought we were going to send France through fire
and blood with ill-considered actions. ft40 Most internal
Resisters did not consider social disorder the highest
evil, but felt rather that the loss of freedom, the humiliation of their country and its compromise to Nazi
principles and policies justified disobedience and in
some cases, killing.
Up to now I have spoken of the Resistance as a whole,
and while there were broad areas of consensus and a simi-
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larity of outlook, conflict and disagreement arose within
the Resistance over both the means and the ends of their
actions.

All Resisters agreed that their primary concern

and the immediate goal of all their actions was the liberation of France, but they disagreed as to the best way
to go about this.

Essentially, the split was between

the external and the internal rlesistance.

Within France,

the itesistance wished to Ucreate a certain psychological
climate around the Germans, to keep them in partial terror all the time, cutting telegraph wires and waiting for
the Allies to land so we could blow up everything. u41
In this group, the Communists were undoubtedly a "magnetic
pole u , as Jacques Duclos, the leader of the Communist Party
during the occupation, put it.
there were a lot of talkers. n42

ttWe were fighters, whereas
Those who believed in

direct immediate action wanted not only to terrorize the
Germans, they also felt it was important for morale to
keep themselves active.
warfare.

"Resistance is permanent guerilla

Three guys intercepting a German convoy in a

road, throwing three grenades, firing their machine guns,
and disappearing into the countryside.

And that was the

only war, not only for training fighters, but for keeping
them. ,,43
De Gaulle and his followers, on the other hand, felt
the price paid was too high, especially after the incidents in Nantes and Bordeaux, where over a hundred hostages were shot in retaliation for the assassination of
a German officer.

De Gaulle, in response to this inci-
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dent, allowed that

nit is both right and natural that

Germans should be killed by Frenchmen • • • But there
are tactics in war • • • My orders to those in occupied
territory are, for the moment, not to kill Germans, for
the good reason that it is too easy for the enemy to retaliate. n44
This conflict over -means led:~ to a certain amount
of distrust and tension.

Jacques Duclos felt that florders
like that should not be obeyed ll • 45 The disagreement over
aims created even more disaccord, particularly among the
various political tendencies within the Resistance.

All

Resisters agreed that after the Liberation France would
need radical reforms, that victory would not be complete
without a renewed France.

However, nobody, republicans

included, wanted a return to the Third Republic.

~

Popu-

laire denied any claim that the Third Republic should
be rescusitated after the war.
tarily to death.1!46

"It gave itself up volun-

Liberation-~ had "no tenderness

for the scandalous pre-war assemblies that, one night,
out of stupeur and shame, abandoned the Fatherland and
the Republic to play the game of defeat's adventurers. u47
Philippe Vianny not only felt that the Third Republic
had abdicated its powers, but that "France does not want
any more 'miserables' • • • France needs new men.,,48
Even Leon Blum wrote to de Gaulle that although the new
French state should be a democracy, he did not want the
restoration of prewar institutions. ttNothing could be
further removed from our thoughts. u49
Yet, unlike the collaborators, they did not condemn
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the Republic for the defeat.

"We will not admit", wrote

Jean Guehenno, "that France for these last fifty years
has been so ugly and ignoble. 1I50 De Gaulle, in a Christmas message to the children of France, reassured them that
lithe enemy and his friends say that France deserved to
be beaten.

But the French nation is made up of your Fa-

thers and Mothers, your brothers.and sisters, and you,
children, know very well they were not to blame.,,51
While all resisters believed that France would have
to be rebuilt after the war, and that they would avoid
returning the constitution or institutions of the Third
Republic, sharp disagreement arose over exactly what form
France should take after the war.

It certainly would be

unacceptable that f'the terrible ordeal should leave standing a social and moral regime that played against the
nation". 52 The Free French of the Interior, while admitting the need for reform, wanted to put off even discussion of aims until after the Liberation.

"When a house

is burning, that is not the time to reset the faulty foundation.

First it is necessary to put out the fire that

threatens to devour everything. ft53
De Gaulle set out his aims as three articles.
ticle One, to wage war, was the most important.

Ar-

Yet he

also realized that rJwe cannot remain indifferent to the
destiny which can and should be hers in the sphere of
domestic politics ••.• Without any shadow of a doubt,
when France emerges from her terrible ordeal, we shall
witness a tremendous national revival.

Need I say that
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the Free French, of all people, could never wish to
oppose such a transformation. ,,54

However, Article Two

dealing with the transformation was rather vague.

tIThe

people must be allowed to choose for themselves as soon
as circumstances make it possible to say freely what they
want and what they will not tolerate.,,55

The only other

goals were Honor and Country, Liberty, Equality, and
Fraternity, and Article Three, Liberation, meaning not
only the defeat of the enemy but also the establishment
of conditions in which Frenchmen could live, work, and
act in dignity and security.
The goals of both the internal and external Free
t..of)"e.r n

French were vague because they were a secondarYI\ and because the Free French, in general career military men,
were somewhat wary of the internal resistance's radicalism which was beyond their control.

Among the more radi-

cal members of the Resistance disagreements arose over
~rance's

future.

Most resisters agreed on political demo-

cracy based on universal suffrage, freedom of speech,
press, and assembly, women's franchise, the inviability
of the home, and secrecy of correspondence, respect for
the human person, and equality before the law.

The pri-··

mary source of conflict was France's economic future.
The more radical movements, such as

~

Voix

~ ~,

called for action against the powerful capitalists who
ran France without concern for the workers and sacrificed
the nation's good for their narrow self-interests.

1!

Revue Libre claimed that Hitler had dealt capitalism its
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death blow and called for the destruction of its last
vestiges.

Franc-Tireur, a Communist paper, called for

a constitutional affirmation of each individual's right
to a part of the national income, the socialization of
public services including banks and insurance, planned
production, and social discipline imposed by a strong
state.
Then there were those still on the Left, socialists
and syndicalists, who still spoke of

l~beration

from

capitalist exploitation, yet did not call for the system's destruction but rather for its transformation.
1iberer

£1

Federer and

Lib€rati~n

were both opposed to

the centralization called for by the more radical resisters.

Rather, they preferred economic and political life

based on small units, communes or federations, that
would govern themselves.

Finally, in the Left-Center,

were those who called for a continuation of the Revolution of 1798, more Equality, more Liberty, and more Fraternity.

The Mouvement Unie de la Resistance (MUR), as~------~

---- -- -- ----=-----

serted that ftthe Resistance will not become an anticapitalist movement Jl ,5 6 a decision only the people could
make only after the Liberation.
The tension that had existed since the Thirties
between the Socialists and the Communists erupted after
the Socialists published a lengthy tract setting out
their specific aims for postwar France.

The Communists

then put out detailed critique of the Socialist program,
denouncing its vagueness and its failure to recognize
that none of their aims, a decent wage for all, rational-
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ized production, could be accomplished without liquidating trusts.

'r he Socialists then published a defense of

their original program,

contin~ng

a by now familiar

quarrel.
Al though this dttssention was always just under the
surface (anyone who carefully read the various tracts
could discern that the groups had contradictory aims),
open arguing like this was unusual, especially since the
Communists did their best not to alarm their fellow resisters and stressed the unity needed to carryon the
struggle.

The Conseil National de

ls Resistance was

formed to unite the various tendencies so as to coordinate their activities as the Liberation approached.

A

list of the groups it finally did include indicates the
difficul ty of the task:

the l'-10uvement de Liberation Na-

tional (included Combat, Franc-Tireur, Liberation, France

A£ Combat,

D~fense

de la France, Lorraine, and Resistance),

La Front Nationale t L:Organization Civile et Militaire,

---- ----

--

Liberation-Nord, Ceux -de -la Resistance, La --~~~~~~
Confederation

~~~~~

G€n€rale de Travail, la Confederation

Fran~aise ~

Tra-

vailleurs Chretiens, Ie Parti Communiste, Ie Parti Socialiste, Ie Parti :lepublicaine-rtadicale et Radicale-Socialiste,
;

le Parti Democrate Populaire, l'Alliance Democratique,
and the Federation Aepublicaine.
In March, 1944, they were able to publish a common
program of political democracy, liberty, suffrage, and
also set out various economic goals:

the eviction of

large economic feudalities from the direction of th e
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economy, rational economic organization which would assure
the subordination of particular interests to the general
interest, the intensification of national production according to a plan drawn up by the state in consultation
with representatives of production, a return to the nation of the monopolized means of production, the fruits
of common work, energy sources, and underground resources,
insurance companies and large banks, the development of
agricultural and trade co-operatives, the right of access
to management of industry to qualified workers and their
participation in economic direction, social security,
the reconstitution of unions and syndicates, a minimum
wage, and allocations for the victims of £ascist terror. 57
The goals were fairly general and left out how
these changes were to be accomplished, yet considering
the range of movements included and the variety of opinions
among them, this program represented a miracle of compromise.

While this union was not likely to survive past

the Liberation, all resisters of whatever political or
religious tendency agreed on "this single idea that made
it possible for us all to work with each other in spite
of everything, we were all agreed on getting rid of Germany and nazism. ,,58
their differences.

The similarities among them overrode
More importantly, they all knew, while

they believed liberation alone was not enough, that fighting among themselves would only lead to their own destruction.

Labaume, a Catholic priest and resister, described

the situation as "a river in torrent, where there are
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pebbles, pieces of wood, paper, all of that, yet they
all flow in the same direction even though they are not
the same. And it was a bit like that. " 59 Another attenuating factor in the disputes was that the rank-and-file
membership of each group cut across party affiliations.
Those who strongly wanted to act joined whatever movement they found and stuck with it, pretty much ignoring
the quarrels of their leaders.

Most resisters did not

even differentiate between the English services and those
of the Free French.
A final unifying factor was the symbol of de Gaulle.
rnoV'('II",f,(lt

Every ResistanceAeventually adopted de Gaulle as their
ultimate leader because they realized his symbolic importance.

Leon Blum in 1942 wrote, "I believe, for myself,

entirely and firmly in the integrity 2nd the loyalty of
the General. I trust in him. H60 Combat described him
as "the one who refused to lay down his arms, the one
who saved honor and kept his word, the one whose example
gave the French the confidence and the eneCJ::'gy that animated them, the one who represents fighting France, eternal France.,,61

The Socialists agreed.

"For us, General

de Gaulle is the natural and necessary symbol of the
sistance and the Liberation. ,,62

~

Liberation-Sud was also

for de. Gaulle, flnot for reasons of clan or interest but
because he knew how to create in France the union of
French patriots against the foreign invasion. ,,63

Be-

cause de Gaulle was Uthe rock in the tempest upon which
all French contradictions dashed themselves into a Least
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Common Denominator ll ,64 he represented a new force in
French politics.

He was able to unite not only the Re-

sistance but eventually drew the support of conservative
social forces that saw in him hope for avoiding anarchy.
De Gaulle was a legend, a miracle man, able to insure
France a place in the Allied Camp and to keep the internal contradictions and quarrels from destroying France.
Overcoming these internal fragmentations, even temporarily, was one significant achievement of the Resistance, a movement whose accomplishments are difficult to
measure.

Their military contributions, how much they

were able to slow down the Germans, the importance of
the information they sent to the Allies, to what extent
they diverted G-erman divisions during D-Day, ,,{ere really
of minor importance.

In these terms the war ran its

course without the Resistance having much effect.

Their

papers and tracts were more significant as they let people
within and outside of France know there was active opposition to the Germans and to Vichy, and also to some extent counteracted the ubiquitous collaborationist and fascist propaganda.

Yet eV8n their papers reached, according

to Paxton, not more than ten percent of the population.
The Resistance did bequeath to France

impa~tant

post-war

leaders, allowed France to be represented as an Allied
power, and to set up her own provisional government.
Finally, the B.esistance changed the lives of those who
participated in it;
and self-worth.

they left with a sense of dignity

That they kept hope alive proved to be
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a legacy for the future.

The R.esistance's most profound

impact was this moral significance.

It proved that there

were people ready to fight and even die to save France,
to preserve liberty, to protest for the respect of human
dignity, and even for "a song, a snap of the fingers,
a smile lf •
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CONCLUSION

The French responded to the Occupation of France in
three ways.

The collaborators, traditional rightists,

decided that France's best option was to work with the
Germans, to make the best of the situation and perhaps
even to profit from it by becoming Germany's partner in
a European bloc.

Because France had been defeated and

occupied by Germany, a certain amount of collaboration
was inevitable.
this minimum.

Yet French collaboration went far beyond
Collaborators intended to make use of the

defeat to remake France, and were able to go as far as
they did in this respect only because they were not opposed by the majority of the French people.

These people

chose not to become actively involved and simply allowed
events to run their course.

Because of the existence

of a French state whose legitimacy derived from the French
Constituent Assembly, rather tha.n from appOintment by
the Germans, the majority of the people were led into
complicity with programs and policies, in particular deportation, of which they would never have
normal circumstances.

~pproved

under

But the French people as a whole

were not held responsible for their nation'S crimes.
They denied any association with the collaborators and
identified, rather, with the Resisters.

This third group

refused to accept the defeat, and considered that the
rebuilding of France could only happen after the Liberation from German occupat&on.

They considered working
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with Germany under any circumstances a compromise of
France's honor.
By identi,fying only with the Hesistance, the French
peoples' selective rewriting of their own and their nation's past has prevented them from eX8.mining what
cimounted to their passive collaboration.

Though we may

find this an unattractive way of dealing with such a
demoralizing and disordered time, it has been the French
peoples' way of putting the war behind them and being
able to look toward the future.

Recent scholarship has

attempted to rec2.pture the true nature of events, but
the French people's real cD.tharsis has not yet occurred.
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